I. Introduction
This article discusses the role and function of environmental principles in terms of how they interplay with or constitute power in the context of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) developing and delivering its written judgments. The interaction of litigants with each other and the Bench of the ICJ is important not only for conveying facts and positions on the law; it shapes how the Court itself learns what its views are on legal issues. The idea that the process of litigation can generate common knowledge which is shared amongst the judges of the Bench and potentially states which might appear before the Court, as well as the future constituency of the ICJ, is the kind of collective social learning that forms the basis of the discussion in this article. It argues that the focus on social learning highlights the significant role that environment principles can play in decisions of the ICJ, notwithstanding their infrequent and direct use in the Court's determination of the legal position of the parties before it. The focus on social learning suggests that discussions on the rule of law ignore the power the ICJ has to shape disputes before it. It also misses the potential of certain kinds of norms to influence disputes and the resolution of them before powerful institutions like the ICJ.
Institutions like the ICJ do not just solve disputes based on what the parties to a case have argued are the right and wrong interpretations of the law and the facts of the case. 1 Functionalist approaches to courts and dispute-resolution bodies can appear disparagingly uninterested in the political character of their work. 2 This is partly symptomatic of the idea that institutions -especially dispute-resolution bodies -are meant to apply their authority without bias or dispositions that favour anything outside of their immediate jurisdiction. 3 Courts are meant to apply rules * Senior Lecturer (PhD) at the Griffith Law School. I wish to thank Professor Rothwell who helped me greatly in shaping this and other recent scholarly activities of mine. I also wish to thank the independent reviewer who commented on this work.
in a neutral and direct way, and anything else is viewed as an inappropriate exercise of their power. 4 This is hardly the case, however, as shown by an abundance of research. 5 When the ICJ adjudicates disputes and delivers the reasons for its decisions, it is also contributing more generally to change in international law and politics rather than simply applying in a neutral way a set of rules to the facts before it. 6 It has been argued that judgments of the ICJ can contribute to change for reasons other than that they are 'legally binding'. 7 It is their persuasiveness that determines the extent to which states will refer to or avoid them. 8 Jennings points to the 'practical authority and power' associated with certain judgments that determine their relative impact on states and their use as a precedent for the ICJ. 9 These ideas encapsulate the potential that international organisations like the ICJ have to exercise authority and power over 'knowledge claims', or the deference that states show to their claims to certain types and kinds of 'knowledge and truth'. 10 In other words, they highlight the potential role or function of the ICJ to Governance and Power (1997) frame and structure the common and collective understanding of states which might litigate before them, as well as the understanding of the Court itself in terms of how it responds to issues at some future date. 11 Section 2 of the article includes a description of the conception of power as a diffuse persuasive force, which forms the basis of the discussion which follows. This is followed in section 3 with a brief description of the use of environmental principles in the judgments of the ICJ. The variable nature of the function and role of environmental principles and their potential for social learning are examined in three ways in the sections that follow. Section 4 discusses how environmental principles interplay with the institutional power of the ICJ to frame the negotiations of states post-adjudication. Although it is arguable that this is a functionalist argument as mentioned above, this section asserts that the background knowledge created during the dispute-resolution process makes environmental principles more meaningful for the parties and shapes how they might use them. Section 5 examines the productive power of ideas which are expressed through the ICJ in dealing with legal issues before it, or in generating a common understanding of an open-textured environmental principle. Sections 5(a) and 5(b) examine whether environmental principles as abbreviated abstractions refer to ideas that shape the Court's approach to the legal issues before it. They compare whether the precautionary principle and sustainable development had a diffuse role in producing the Court's approach in the Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia). 12 This comparative study aims to assess whether environmental principles can produce how the ICJ develops a common understanding of an interpretive position in relation to issues before it. Section 6 analyses whether the open-textured nature of Principle 2 of the United Nations Declaration on Environment and Development 13 or Principle 21 of the 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 14 has enabled the ICJ to generate a unique common understanding amongst several of its judgments, which is a significant departure from its established understanding in international law.
II. Power and Social Learning
There is no doubt that power is a ubiquitous feature of social and political life internationally. Our answers to how it is constituted, enable us to better understand why actors at the international level behave the way they do towards each other and how they collectively form interests in particular matters. The concept of power is more widely interpreted and critiqued than probably any other idea used in the social sciences. 15 In international relations, the realist conception of power still has a strong pull, although recent scholarship in the area has clearly sought to displace it. 16 However, there are different ways to conceptually categorise power which can in turn shape how we understand particular events and decisions. Conceptions of power have the potential to shape how we understand and approach the work of formal or informal dispute-resolution institutions at the international level, and how environmental principles frame or structure change through them in international law and politics. This article adopts the conception of power discussed and theorised in international relations by Barnett and Duvall. 17 The international law literature makes use of the concept of power, but draws upon international relations for its source of sociological inspiration. 18 Barnett and Duvall define power as the 'production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate '. 19 This is quite different from the conception of power that sees it in relational terms. Baldwin, for instance, views power as the 'capacity to get somebody else to do what he or she would not have done otherwise'. 20 Barnett and Duvall would argue that their definition brings together two core dimensions which would differentiate it from Baldwin's. They characterise them as 'the kinds of social relations through which power works, and the specificity of the social relations through which power's effects are produced'. 21 They use their definition of power and the two dimensions of it to develop a taxonomy which avoids having to prioritise discussions of agency and structure. 22 Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy of power is represented below in Figure 1 . They refer in Figure 1 to the institutional and productive powers which this section describes as expressions of diffused power. In either instance, the real production of the effects of power depends on actors interacting with each other within a social context to collectively learn rather than directly being required to adjust predetermined preferences. Additionally, as discussed in section 2 below, historically the ICJ has not often used its direct power to adjudicate the rights of parties in terms of their obligations to comply with environmental principles. The rest of this section discusses the ideas of institutional and productive power which are applied later in this article. 27 to argue that it is more likely for institutions to exist independently of 'specific resource-laden actors'. 28 This position is consistent with constructivist ontology, which argues that power and interests do not exist independently of interactions within groups. 29 The social distance between taking an action and the production of its effects on an actor is a feature of this particular conception of power. As a result of this 'lag between stimulus and effect', the exact effects or results of power cannot easily be identified. 30 This particular conception sees the potential of power to have effects even when the social relations between actors are at a 'physical, temporal and social distance' from each other. 31 This means that in institutions, for instance, an actor cannot directly control or exercise power over someone else. Although ultimately the power of an actor might express itself in producing certain effects on others, this will happen in a diffuse way. This is in contrast to the classical realist account of power which see actor A as using their material, normative and symbolic resources to directly control actor B in a particular situation. 32 Institutional power works through the 'socially extended, institutionally diffuse relations' that parties have with each other. This means that power will only express itself because actors socialise with each other through and within the structures established within the formal or informal institution. Barnett and Duvall's conception of institutional power is different from their conception of power as productive in terms of constituting particular social relations amongst actors. What institutional power shares with productive power is its focus on the diffuse way in which it can have effects on actors.
(b) Productive power
In contrast to the concept of institutional power, productive power is more concerned with constitutive social processes which are not necessarily controlled by 'specific actors' but which are effected through the 'meaningful practices of actors'. 33 The social processes that create meaning for actors in terms of what they can do in a particular context also shape their understanding of who they are and what they want. The idea of productive power, according to Barnett and Duvall, is a diffuse and general social process. This means that it is more about systems of Barnett and Duvall, 'Power in Global Governance', above n 17, 16. 29 See, for instance, Steinberg and Zasloff, above n 18, 82.
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considering the various ways in which actors interplay with reifications and meaning or episteme. 34 In the context of environmental issues, for instance, anthropocentricism is a system that signifies particular ways in which an actor will relate to others in terms of how they view their relationship to the environment. It is also a discourse, or a 'social process and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed'. 35 In the context of anthropocentricism, it means that actors will socialise in a way that will shape intersubjectives structure to favour human interests over the environment. As a result, the preferences of actors to protect nature for its own sake will be working against the deeper discourse that underpins the discussions being had about the environment. Drawing from Foucault, Adler and Bernstein have also argued in the context of international relations that knowledge is productive in the sense of defining and constituting the social reality or the order of global things. 36 Adler and Bernstein use the term 'knowledge' to refer to the power that discourse has to produce particular social facts.
The idea of productive power is built on the conception of power as a 'social process' whereby actors come to see themselves as having particular social identities or capacities in particular situations. 37 The interaction of individual judges with each other and the litigants throughout the proceedings helps produce the way they interplay with and are constituted by social facts, knowledge or reifications of various kinds, which include norms like environmental principles. This implies that this conception of power is inherently connected with the social learning process which shapes how the ICJ as a group of judges interpret particular facts or the law with which they are dealing. In this sense, power is expressed through the ICJ as opposed to something that it can wield against others.
III. The International Court of Justice and Environmental Principles
Various international judicial, tribunal or arbitral bodies have jurisdiction and have dealt with aspects of international environmental law, and in particular have employed environmental principles in their work. 38 International Court of Justice, situated at the apex of international tribunals, necessarily enjoys a position of special trust and responsibility in relation to the formal and written deliberations that make up its judgment, use established and commonly referred to environmental principles. The fact that this is the case points to the difficulty of directly applying environmental principles in the context of legal dispute settlement. Importantly, although the ICJ might not commonly use environmental principles to exercise its compulsory power over litigants, this does not indicate whether such principles have a role or function as part of the social learning within the Court. The sections that follow aim to examine the variety of different roles and functions that environmental principles have, and that they could play in relation to the work of the ICJ.
IV. Post-Adjudication Dialogue and Negotiation
Quite often, scholarship in international law views the judgments of international dispute-resolution bodies as an end to the relevant social context that gives shape to the evolution of a particular dispute and its resolution. 54 In many instances, negotiations continue beyond the actual litigation before the international dispute resolution body. Given the social nature of interactions during the litigation process, post-conflict dialogue can continue in the shadow of the judicial decisions handed down by the institution dealing with an international dispute. 55 The institutional structure that sustains this post-conflict dialogue is the traditional diplomatic relationships that states have with each other. It is a collective effort because the ICJ's judgment is integral to the way the parties engage with each other after the relevant judgment has been handed down by the Court. It is in this sense that the ICJ is, notwithstanding the 'social distance', exercising power indirectly and diffusely. 56 The Court, as discussed in this section, frames social learning and the development of common knowledge amongst the actors by drawing on the open-textured nature of principles to communicate with them during their post-conflict negotiations.
principles of environmental law especially those relating to what is described in environmental law as the Global Commons. (Weeramantry V-P, dissenting at 345). Barnett and Duvall, 'Power in Global Governance', above n 17, 11.
Barnett and Duvall's conception of institutional power, as discussed earlier in this article, 57 requires that the institution be independent of the actors who operate within them. Decisions of the ICJ establish that independence by virtue of the judgment they render for and against the parties. That is, the post-conflict negotiations are conducted in the shadow of a judgment that has established certain normative implications for those discussions and created the necessary independence of the actors from each other. A resort to post-conflict negotiations conducted in the shadow of a judgment can give parties further reason to negotiate the real differences between them in terms of the ethical and aesthetic values that are at issue. Barnett and Finnemore have, for instance, argued that international organisations can frame issues in particular ways so that 'desired choices seem particularly compelling'. 58 That is, international organisations can 'structure situations and social understandings in ways that channel behaviour toward some outcomes rather than others'. 59 International organisations can engage in practices whereby they classify or invent social categories which can then constitute the way actors deal with the social world around them. 60 Adler and Bernstein, using a similar idea, argue that 'episteme' or intersubjectivity can be mobilised by institutions as a resource to shape what actors take to be valid knowledge or understanding of their social reality. 61 Environmental principles can be mobilised by the ICJ to frame and structure post-conflict dialogue. The power that the ICJ has is further promoted by giving context to negotiations after the actual litigation has finished. What the litigating parties take as useful or valid for post-conflict negotiations is an expression of this power, which would not be mobilised as easily without environmental principles. The importance of this point is that the litigating parties might not ordinarily use environmental principles to frame and structure their negotiations arising from a particular dispute. However, their interactions with each other, as mediated through the ICJ, give shape to their preferences in a way which might make the use of principles seem natural or the best way to continue to deal with the problems between them. It is in this sense that environmental principles can frame and structure ongoing discussions without giving the impression that participants are compelled to follow particular rules or narrow formulations of what is right or wrong to do. That is, the exercise of power using environmental principles is indirect because its effects are not going to be caused by the Court but rather will depend on how the parties interpret their positions in the light of the environmental principles that gives meaning to how they view their circumstances. 57 See above section II.
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Barnett and Finnemore, 'The Power of Liberal International Organizations', above n 2, 176-77. 59 Ibid 177. In their own work on international organisations, Barnett and Finnemore at 177-78 highlight how international organisations determine outcomes in the way they set agendas of meetings or classify practices of states. In doing this, the courts and tribunals interplay with environmental principles to harness their own institutional power in a 'responsive' or 'reflexive' way. The idea that international adjudication might facilitate litigants to resolve their disputes, as opposed to ruling on all aspects of their case, is not new. 62 Environmental principles give courts and tribunals a chance to facilitate dialogue in a way that is potentially responsive to the needs of each party. In this way, they are central to the exercise of power by courts and tribunals by virtue of their abstraction and the communicative potential that comes with those qualities. However, the power that the Court exercises is dependent on the knowledge that disputing states have about their situation from the decision of the case they are involved with. More importantly, the Court can be seen as creating opportunities for the parties to progressively realise for themselves the implications of environmental principles in the context of their disputes. 63 In this sense, the environmental principles frame a state's ongoing self-realisation of its interests in the light of the dispute in which it is engaged. This is obviously a different kind of an argument to the power the ICJ might have in terms of principles functioning as a justiciable standard of review of the conduct of parties.
The idea that the ICJ engages with or relies on post-adjudicative negotiations to alleviate the reasons for the dispute arising in the first place finds expression in a number of its decisions. For instance, in the 1984 case on the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), 64 the ICJ had been asked by the United States to consider the ecological conditions of the marine ecosystem in the process of delimiting the Gulf of Maine as between it and Canada. 65 The proposal was aimed at ensuring that one of the parties to the dispute would have the entire region to maintain the integrity of the ecosystem for straddling stocks of fish. The particular stock was at that time being overfished, and it was becoming endangered as a species. The ICJ decided the case by drawing the boundaries between the two countries across the natural ecosystem and instead indicated that the United States and Canada should cooperate to take care of the environmental challenges caused by the Court's decision. 66 Gillroy argues that the ICJ refused the sustainability argument put to it and instead opted 'for the more established sovereignty principle of "equity" to create the boundary, thus bifurcating the aqua-ecosystem between the two states.' 67 Although in this case the ICJ did not draw on an environmental principle to frame its post-conflict negotiations, it explicitly relied on the fact that the United States and Canada would engage with each other after the litigation to ensure that the ecosystem would not get harmed as a result of the decision by the Court. 68 In the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Germany v Iceland), 69 the ICJ had to consider whether Iceland could have legally extended its fisheries zone to 50 nautical miles and excluded fishing vessels from it. It decided that Iceland could not have extended its fisheries zone beyond its territorial sea but that it had preferential rights over fisheries resources beyond it. 70 The ICJ also emphasised conservation measures in several statements, one of which is particularly important for this discussion. This is because of the way the Court connects to future interactions between the parties. It stated that:
both Parties have the obligation to keep under review the fishery resources in the disputed waters and to examine together, in the light of scientific and other available information, the measures required for the conservation and development, and equitable exploitation, of those resources, taking into account any international agreement in force between them. 71 In this paragraph, the ICJ conceptually maps or frames what the parties need for their interactions with each other beyond the dispute in that case. It situates the decision to grant rights to Iceland within the language of having to negotiate in relation to conservation of the resources. The argument noted above will now be further illustrated through the work of the ICJ in the Danube Dam Case. This is because it is the most recent example of this kind of interaction between the ICJ and litigants after the formal dispute-settlement process has finished and also because the Court uses the language of environmental norms and principles to guide it. Also, Hungary with Czechoslovakia. 75 The 1997 Treaty had envisaged, amongst other things, that two locks would be constructed, one at Gabčíkovo (now Slovakia) and the other in Nagymaros (in Hungary). A dam would also be built at Dunakiliti, which is in the Hungarian portion of the Danube. These projects would develop the energy and navigational needs of both countries as well as protect particular parts of the countries from flooding. When Hungary pulled out of the project, one of its arguments related to the belief that further participation in the project would not be consistent with Hungary's obligations to protect the environment, water quality and fisheries of the Danube. Hungary had argued that the project would be inconsistent with its international obligation to prevent environmental harm and the Slovak Republics' obligations to avoid serious environmental harm. 76 Around 1991, Hungary showed little interest in working further on the project. Czechoslovakia (as it was in 1991) started constructing an overflow dam in Cunovo and later diverted the Danube through it. The effect of this diversion on riparian areas of the Danube in Hungary was considerable. This was in addition to reducing the total quantity of water that flowed through the Hungarian portion of the Danube. Before the ICJ, Hungary had argued that the diversion of the Danube and the damage it had done were, amongst other matters, a breach of international environmental laws. 77 The specific points raised related, amongst other matters, to the obligation not to cause damage to the environment beyond ones border, and the need to give prior notification to neighbouring states of activities that might cause significant damage to their environment. 78 The ICJ rejected both these arguments relating to the termination of the 1977 Treaty by pointing out that articles 15, 19 and 20 allowed for these new and emerging concerns relating to the environment to be integrated into the bilateral contractual relationship. 79 The Court in turn argued that emerging environmental norms actually enhanced the relevance of articles 15, 19 and 20 of that treaty for the parties as they negotiated their Joint Contractual Plan to implement the agreement. 80 The Court said that 'newly developed norms of environmental law' were 'relevant' to the ongoing discussions because they could use articles of the 1977 Treaty to agree on ways to integrate them into their negotiations.
The Court remained vague and ambiguous about what these 'newly developed norms of environmental law' were. 81 In the Danube Dam Case, a reference to the pleadings of Hungary, which had more strenuously developed its environmental arguments, makes it clear that it drew heavily from environmental principles in developing its arguments. In particular, the precautionary principle as an expression of the more general principle of preventing harm to the environment gave shape to Hungary's arguments about terminating its obligations in relation to the 1977 Treaty. 82 In relation to the diversion of the Danube to operate the Gabčíkovo power plant, Hungary had argued, amongst other things, that this was in breach of Czechoslovakia's (now Slovakia) obligation not to cause damage to the environment beyond its sovereign borders. 83 These arguments clearly reflect those arising out of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. Additionally, Hungary also argued that Slovakia had an obligation to give it prior notification and to consult with it in relation to the construction of 77 For Hungary's pleadings before the Court in relation to its allegations that Czechoslovakia had illegally diverted the Danube, see ibid 219-33. Variant C and diversion of the Danube. This argument was based on, for example, Principle 19 of the Rio Declaration. 84 What is most striking when one compares the arguments of Hungary with the final prescriptive judgment of the ICJ is the similarities in the kind of environmental principles it ended up referring to in its judgment compared with those Hungary used in its pleadings before the Court itself. First, it should be noted that the ability of the Court to make such a recommendation was only possible because articles 15, 19 and 20 were very generally worded to allow Hungary and Slovakia, in the process of drafting their future Joint Contractual Plans, to negotiate with each other in relation to the quality of the water of the Danube (art 15), the protection of nature (art 19) and fisheries (art 20). For instance, article 15 provided that the: 'Contracting Parties shall ensure, by the means specified in the joint contractual plan, that the quality of the water in the Danube is not impaired as a result of the construction and operation of the System of Locks.' 85 This meant that, in the context of doing what the 1977 Treaty between them provided, Hungary and Slovakia had to think about how new norms could progressively be applied to their particular situation. In this sense, the Court's prescriptions were contextualised within the relationship that Hungary and Slovakia had already developed. Therefore, Hungary's reference to environmental principles must naturally form the basis of any argument as to what those 'new norms' must be, and in particular the way it must have shaped the manner in which the Court phrased its prescriptive formulations for Hungary and Slovakia in their post-adjudicative negotiations. The Court's judgment in this respect provided that it:
is mindful that, in the field of environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often irreversible character of damage to the environment and of the limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type of damage. 86 This reference to the precautionary principle was further supported and built on when the Court also referred to sustainable development as a way forward for the parties to 'reconcile economic development with protection of the environment'. 87 One might argue that the exercise of institutional power to establish the precautionary principle and sustainable development (for instance) as a communicative norm in this particular context was paying lip service to the issue. However, from the Court's perspective, it had found fault in the conduct of both parties in ways that encouraged them to further negotiate. It had also found that Slovakia had breached the 1979 Treaty and the law on watercourses by diverting the Danube into a variant C of the dam system that it had constructed to avoid economic loss. The application of the more determinate and closed rules to the case allowed the Court to engage both parties in a way that would have no impact on, or would maintain its own legitimacy as, a dispute-resolution body.
Since the ICJ's judgment, Slovakia and Hungary have not yet reached an agreement on implementation of the ruling. 88 The two countries were meant to have concluded an agreement in 2006 but this has not happened as yet. The effort made to move forward cooperatively reveals that the work of the ICJ was decisive in giving direction to the environmental concerns raised during the case. In 2001, a draft agreement between Hungary and Slovakia describing how they would proceed in their negotiations identified sustainable development and the principle of precaution as two guiding norms. 89 Additionally, minutes of 2006 meetings held between the two states reveal that they adopted a number of international agreements as between them to give further guidance in terms of their negotiations. 90 This is important given that Slovakia, during the litigation before the ICJ, had emphasised the social and economic impacts of the diversion of the Danube rather than environmental concerns. 91 What is instructive about this discussion is that the power of the Court over the litigants in the post-adjudication phase was framed by emphasising that their 1977 Treaty could not properly be implemented in the future without reference to environmental norms. This was so even though the Court did not use environmental principles to declare whether or not the parties had acted properly in relation to the situation before them. This exercise of diffuse power over post- The open-textured nature of the norms allowed for the exercise of institutional power by the ICJ in ways that more determine and defined rules would not have been able to achieve. This is because of the impact this kind of decision would have on the Court's legitimacy and presence as an international institution created to do what it was precisely seen as delegating. However, the open-textured nature of the environmental principles contains a sufficient degree of intersubjectivity for the Court to use the contours of the norms for the court to defer making policy decisions for the parties, and instead create opportunities for them to give direction to how they will commonly identify with each other. In a way, the ICJ might indirectly be acknowledging the fact that the social or real interests of the parties might be resolved by opening up the legal domain in a way that allows for this to happen. 92
V. Productive Power and Environmental Principles in the Danube Dam Case
Gillroy has examined whether the principle of sustainable development is used by courts and tribunals as an adjudicatory norm 93 -that is, not as a norm capable of being used directly by parties to generate propositions about their position in relation to the other litigants, but by the Court to resolve international disputes. This is partly consistent with the argument that Lowe made in a powerfully argued piece discussing the normative potential of sustainable development in ordering principles and rules in international dispute resolution. 94 fisheries law or water law. 96 An alternative way to phrase this approach is to argue that the concept or idea of sustainable development can 'penetrate older terminology', especially when it is being applied some time in the future. 97 These various discussions appear to draw from the potential productive power of the idea of sustainable development in shaping the way courts, tribunals and litigants before them constitute the world to which they are seeking to give meaning and the reconciliation of different pulls on their preferences. 98 Contrary to Lowe, Gillroy's sustained and detailed examination of the decisions of the various international courts and tribunals shows that sustainable development is not an adjudicatory norm, even though he argues that it has a status as a principle of international law. 99 Sustainable development, however, is inherently linked to the idea of protecting the future generation, though it does not specify whether anything in particular must be sustained for them. Sustainability, in other words, is not a particularly high standard to meet in terms of the minimum that is required to protect the interest of the future generation. As an abbreviated and abstract environmental principle, it points to varying conceptions of how society and its relationship to nature can be socially constituted by different actors and groups. For instance, in a dispute about protecting an entire ecosystem, some might argue that it is necessary to maintain its Adler and Bernstein have used the word 'epistemes' to describe the discourses that have produced how actors use to view the world: Adler and Bernstein, above n 36, 295. The idea of 'episteme' in the context of the work of the ICJ has been raised in section 4. Episteme is 'the background intersubjective knowledge -collective understandings and discourses -that adopt the form of human dispositions and practices that human beings use to make sense of the world': Adler and Bernstein, above n 36, 295. This background knowledge, they argue, produces institutions in particular ways. The application of this idea to international courts and tribunals is not new. For instance, Sandholtz and Sweet, in discussing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute-settlement regime, have argued that, amongst other norms, the most favoured nation principles generated a 'sophisticated, relatively autonomous domains of legal discourse, replete with their own stable or argumentation frameworks': W Sandholtz and A S Sweet, 'Law, Politics, and International Governance' in C ReusSmit (ed), The Politics of International Law (2004) 238, 254 (footnotes omitted). They point out at 254 that, by the 1980s, an understanding of the most favoured nation principle 'could only be understood in light of the argument frameworks curated by the panels' of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (emphasis in original). That is, the WTO dispute settlement regime produced the way that certain ideas about trade could be internationally understood. 99 Gillroy, above n 43, 2. He examines the concept in the work of the ICJ, the World Trade Organization's Appellate Body, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and also the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations. He argues at 50 that the notion of sovereignty produces the responses of the ICJ against sustainability; and the WTO's Appellate Body defines itself by promoting economic efficiency, which trumps sustainability as an adjudicatory norm. current condition because it would otherwise deprive the future generation of clean air. Others might equally argue that sustainability requires that the area also be preserved because it has aesthetic benefits as well. 100 A useful way of exploring whether a tribunal or court itself, as an institution, is constructed by the discourse or episteme to which sustainable development or other environmental principles point is to examine its reaction to issues before it in the context of whether it changes established ideas or socially learns how to respond differently to qualitative tests in legal propositions before it. It is through the actual social practises of a court like the ICJ that we can understand the meaning and function of environmental principles, and potentially their ability to produce what the Court does in context.
In the following discussion in sections 5(a) and 5(b), the roles of the precautionary principle and sustainable development respectively are analysed in the context of the Danube Dam Case. The question examined in each section is whether the respective environmental principles produced how the Court approached the legal issues before it.
(a) Ecological necessity and the precautionary principle
In the Danube Dam Case, the ICJ was asked by Hungary to consider whether its abandonment of the 1977 Treaty between itself and Czechoslovakia (at that time) was necessary because of the imminent peril to the ecological condition of the Danube, which constituted an essential interest of Hungary. 101 This argument was based on article 33 of the International Law Commission's (ILC) Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 102 which the ICJ recognised as reflecting customary law. 103 Article 33(1)(a) gives a state the ability to avoid its international law obligations if what it did 'was the only means of safeguarding' an 'essential interest' it had 'against a grave and imminent peril'. 104 For the purpose of this discussion, the key portion of Hungary's argument which caused difficulties was whether the damage caused by the diversion of the Danube by Slovakia was perilous and imminent. 105 The Court, however, examined whether the abandonment of the 1977 Treaty, as a whole, by Hungary could have been justified on the basis that the imminent peril of the entire project (and not just the Variant C that Slovakia had constructed in breach of the 1977 Treaty) necessitated stopping work on the project. The Court therefore sought to interpret whether the potential harm inherent in the entire project established by the 1977 Treaty was imminent and perilous.
The Court's interpretation of the terms 'imminent' and 'peril' in article 33(1)(a) of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, and its application to the facts of the case, highlight how the precautionary principle in this situation failed to frame its approach. The Court said the following in relation to these words:
The word 'peril' certainly evokes the idea of 'risk'; that is precisely what distinguishes 'peril' from material damage. But a state of necessity could not exist without a 'peril' duly established at the relevant point in time; the mere apprehension of a possible 'peril' could not suffice in that respect. It could moreover hardly be otherwise, when the 'peril' constituting the state of necessity has at the same time to be 'grave' and 'imminent'. 'Imminence' is synonymous with 'immediacy' or 'proximity' and goes far beyond the concept of 'possibility'. 106 This view of article 33(1)(a) presumes that a peril must be unavoidable at the time it is said to eventuate if a state is allowed to evoke the state of necessity argument. 107 The Court went on to find that the perils claimed by Hungary were 'uncertain' in 1989 when Hungary took steps to terminate its obligations under the 1977 Treaty. 108 It appears to have been looking for scientific 'certainty' in terms of whether there was likely to be some kind of peril for the essential interests of the state of Hungary. The Court was certainly not bothered by the argument that the potential peril, if ascertained with certainty, might be in the future because it stated that: a 'peril' appearing in the long term might be held to be 'imminent' as soon as it is established, at the relevant point in time, that the realization of that peril, however far off it might be, is not thereby any less certain and inevitable. 109 The key reason for rejecting Hungary's argument therefore appears to have been its assessment of the 'uncertainty' of whether the project was sufficiently perilous to warrant terminating it. 105 As stated above, the Court did acknowledge that the term 'peril' evoked the idea that the material damage had not actually occurred, but that there was a 'risk' it might happen. The ILC in its commentary on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility does not appear to have said anything about the level of scientific certainty required to assess the nature of a 'peril'. 110 Therefore, the Court in this case had the potential to determine for itself whether it would make a policy choice to adopt the idea that the reference to the level of risk in the term 'peril' had to be established with certainty or could be left uncertain. 111 It has been argued that the precautionary principle refers to 'uncertain risk' rather than requiring states to take preventative action when risk has been established with certainty. 112 Hungary, in its written memorial to the ICJ in the Danube Dam Case, referred to the precautionary principle as an expression of the concept of prevention in international environmental law. In this way, it also highlighted the ideas of the uncertainty of risk. 113 The difference between certain and uncertain risk is in the 'link of cause and effect between an event that might occur and the damage anticipated as a result'. 114 What is risky about the certainty of the event occurring or the unpredictability of it is '[o]nly the length of time that will elapse'. 115 In the context of the Danube Dam Case, the ICJ argued that 'dangers ascribed to the upstream reservoir were mostly of a long-term nature and, above all, that they remained uncertain'. 116 That is, the Court was more concerned in this case with establishing the certainty of harm than worrying about the risk of whether it would occur or not at some time in the future. Clearly, the Court was not dismissing the need to prevent environmental harm. At one point, it said that: 110 On this, see also In the field of environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often irreversible character of damage to the environment and of the limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type of damage. 117 Nonetheless, it did adopt an interpretation of 'imminent' and 'peril' which favoured prevention as opposed to precaution. It seems to have ignored the debates and discussions relating to 'uncertainty'. 118 This suggests that the precautionary principle has yet to have a productive effect on framing the power the Court will exercise in determining issues before it.
Memorial of the Republic of Hungary in the Case
In appears from this discussion that the Court was being conservative about its own role in the resolution of disputes involving claims of uncertain risk to the environment. Its interpretation of art 33(1)(a) of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility as requiring certain risk in relation to establishing a 'peril' meant that the Court was also restricting any opportunities states might have to abuse the potential of this provision, which it claimed is now part of customary international law. It presumes the capacity of a state to be able to prove with certainty whether harm will occur or not in making out a case for ecological necessity. It is also arguable that the Court has changed the potential nature of the issues that future litigants might raise before it where they might involve claims based on the precautionary principle.
(b) Equitable utilisation and sustainable development
In 1997, Hungary, in its submission to the ICJ in the Danube Dam Case, argued that Variant C took away between 40 and 43 per cent of the 50 per cent of the waters of the Danube that would otherwise be available for its use. 119 Slovakia had argued, however, that Variant C was a 'justified countermeasure to Hungary's illegal acts'. 120 The ICJ responded to Slovakia's argument by declaring that it had deprived Hungary of its right to equitably use the Danube as a natural resource. The Court also noted that one of the legal effects of its decision was that, in interpreting articles 15, 19 and 20 of the 1977 Treaty, it had to 'look afresh at the effects on the environment of the operation of the Gabčíkovo power plant' using 'new norms' and 'new standards'. 121 This discussion looks more closely at the Court's declaration relating to the lack of proportionality in Slovakia's countermeasures against Hungary. 117 Hungary had argued that the diversion had deprived it of its right to 50 per cent of the flow of the Danube. Slovakia had argued, however, that Variant C was in fact the optimal way to use the Danube given that the relevant circumstances were brought about by Hungary's intentions to terminate the Treaty. 122 Importantly, Slovakia drew on article 6 of the 1991 ILC draft articles on the Law of NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses 123 to argue that the relevant criteria for determining what was equitable and reasonable included those relating to the social and economic impacts of the diversion rather than the environmental criteria. 124 This was in total contrast to Hungary's arguments, which relied on environmental considerations relating to the equitable and reasonable use of the Danube as a resource.
The portion of the Court's judgment in the Danube Dam Case which is discussed in this section is extracted here to facilitate a closer reading of it. The Court wrote:
In the view of the Court, an important consideration is that the effects of a countermeasure must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking account of the rights in question. [the] community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a common legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian States in the user of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian State in relation to the others' … Modern development of international law has strengthened this principle for non-navigational uses of international watercourses as well, as evidenced by the adoption of the Convention of 21 May 1997 on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses by the United Nations General Assembly.
The Court considers that Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally assuming control of a shared resource, and thereby depriving Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube -with the continuing effects of the diversion of these waters on the ecology of the riparian area of the Szigetkoz -failed to respect the proportionality which is required by international law. 125 In this part of its judgment, the Court endorses the idea, initially developed in the Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder, 126 that there is a 'common legal right' to a 'community of interest in a navigable river'. 127 It claimed that this right had been strengthened through '[m]odern' developments of it 'in international law'. 128 Slovakia could not have 'unilaterally' assumed 'control of a shared resource' -namely the Danube -and as a result deprived 'Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube'. 129 Earlier in its judgment, the Court had also confirmed the importance and relevance of the idea of equitable and reasonable use when it declared that Hungary had not 'forfeited its basic right to an equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources of an international watercourse' just because it had violated its terms by not continuing to implement them. 130 In this sense, the Court simply confirmed the presence of a right to an equitable and reasonable share of a natural resource, and acknowledged the rights states had to not have it unilaterally taken away from them by a state upstream to them.
In highlighting the presence of this right to equitably and reasonably use an international watercourse, the Court referred to the 1997 Watercourses Convention. 131 However, it did not make explicit reference to article 5, which actually codifies the idea upon which it had drawn. 132 In relation to the Court's pronouncement of the disproportionate nature of the countermeasure taken by Slovakia, Higgins has written that the:
Court must be taken to have linked the unilateral control to its finding that Hungary was deprived of an equitable and reasonable share of the natural resource. And it appears to have determined that such a deprivation cannot be proportionate to any prior illegality relating to the watercourse (and not just that the deprivation caused in the instant case was disproportionate to the prior illegalities of suspension and abandonment). 133 What is interesting about this observation is that there is nothing wrong with a state, on its own, deciding how to use an international river. This is so, as long as its decision does not impact on the potential of other states to enjoy equitable use of the same international watercourse. 134 What is therefore at issue, and which Higgins does not really get to, is what Hungary was in fact deprived of that was so significant to have made the unilateral decision of Slovakia so meaningful for the Court. It is therefore clear that the group of judges deciding the case must have had something else at the back of their minds when making this rather difficult and yet crucial pronouncement in terms of the rights and interests of Slovakia in particular. That is, it could not have been the concern that Slovakia had decided unilaterally to take away Hungary's right to a natural resource. McCaffrey also confirms the vagueness of the ICJ's approach when he voices his interest in the way the Court rejected Slovakia's claim to having taken a proportionate countermeasure. He has written that 'it is remarkable that the Court seemed to believe it was obvious that Slovakia's diversion was per se a disproportionate response to Hungary's internationally wrongful act'. 135 McCaffrey is suggesting that the Court must have weighed Slovakia's actions in contrast to the disadvantages for Hungary. This is important because it has been argued that either actual or potential transfrontier harm is not in itself problematic unless a state can show that, because of this, it has lost its right to an equitable and reasonable utilisation of the international watercourse. 136 The Court certainly voiced its concern over the impact of Variant C on Hungary. It pointed out that the diversion of the Danube had 'continuing effects' on the ecology of the riparian area of the Szigetkoz. 137 Nevertheless, the Court avoided evoking the idea that 'no harm' must come to any watercourse state and thereby gave priority to the idea of equitable and reasonable utilisation. 138 This is confirmed by the fact that the ICJ did not refer to article 7 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention, which is also important in the context of this discussion. Article 7 provides that 'watercourse States shall … take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse states'.
It is important to look to article 5(1) of the 1997 Watercourses Convention to understand this puzzling but crucial part of the judgment of the Court, 139 It provides that:
Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse. 140 What is important about article 5(1) is that, in its draft form -namely the 1991 and 1994 ILC draft articles on watercourses -there was no reference to the term 'sustainable' in the context of what equitable and reasonable utilisation might mean to states. The Preamble to the 1997 Watercourses Convention also identifies sustainable utilisation as an important goal to promote for the 'present and future generations' and which was not present in the 1991 and 1994 version of the same instrument. It must be noted, however, that the 1997 Watercourses Convention had been adopted on 21 May 1997 by the General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA) (four months before the case was heard by the Court), meaning that its status as customary law was still debatable and the instrument had certainly not come into force as a treaty at the time the ICJ was referring to it. Despite these comments, the Convention did reflect around 20 years of work by the ILC. 141 What stands out in article 5(1) is the idea that, to equitably and reasonably use an international watercourse, a state must take the sustainable and optimal use of the natural resource into account. Article 5(1) does not say that this has to be an explicit part of the consideration, but a meaningful assessment of equitable use cannot ignore sustainability. Some have argued that the concept of equitable and reasonable use of a watercourse is synonymous with the idea of using it sustainably. 142 Importantly, considerations of sustainability potentially add new elements to what is equitable and reasonable in the sense that they bring to the forefront the needs of the future generation. That is, one big difference between 138 For a discussion of 'equitable and reasonable utilisation' in the context of the 1997
Watercourses Convention, see C B Bourne, ' equitable and sustainable utilisation is the presence of the future generation in producing the Court's power over the litigation. In fact, before the 1997 Watercourses Convention was approved by the UNGA, writers had argued that the concept of equitable utilisation and the criteria for determining it did not value the future generation properly. 143 The reference to the future generation in the Preamble of the 1997 Watercourses Convention also confirms this new priority of the agreement as highlighted in article 5(1).
From this, one might conclude that the unsustainability of Variant C lies in the impact it would have had on the future generation because of the effects not only of the water quality of the river but the riparian areas of Szigetkoz which the Court itself highlighted in its judgment. 144 As a result, the unilateral control of the river is significant in terms of its implications for the future generation. This conclusion, though not obvious on an immediate reading of paragraph [85] of the judgment, is confirmed implicitly in paragraph [140] where the Court wrote that 'this need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development'. More importantly it continued to say that:
For the purposes of the present case, this means that the Parties together should look afresh at the effects on the environment of the operation of the Gabčíkovo power plant. In particular they must find a satisfactory solution for the volume of water to be released into the old bed of the Danube and into the side-arms on both sides of the river. 145 This reference to needing to reconsider their operations in the light of concerns about sustainable development adds support to the observations about why the Court might have decided that Slovakia's diversion of the Danube was disproportionate as a countermeasure to what Hungary had done. The inability to properly formulate what the rights of the future generation might be worth could have given enough reason to the Court to avoid a discussion of it in its judgment.
Sustainable development in its interplay with the power of the Court produced an alternative possibility for the application of the equitable utilisation of international watercourses in the Danube Dam Case. It is accurate to suggest that the Court learnt through its interaction with Hungary and Slovakia that the articulation of sustainability in article 5(1) of the 1997 Watercourses Convention was necessary. This is important given the lack of apparent connections before this case between the concepts of equitable utilisation and sustainable development. 146 Sustainable development appears to have functioned not as a norm with a particular fixed meaning, but as an episteme that gave was being asked to do in relation to the equitable use of an international watercourse. The power of the Court was disciplined in favour of giving extra protection to the environment in circumstances that could just as easily have tipped in favour of the social and economic priorities of managing watercourses. In this sense, sustainable development appears to have heightened the awareness of the Court in favour of existing norms that states had adopted which favoured the environmental dimension of the use of international rivers. In contrast to the above discussion in section 5(a) on the precautionary principle, it is arguable that sustainable development had more of a productive effect on the Court because it interpreted equitable utilisation in favour of environmental concerns raised by Hungary. This is in contrast to its interpretation of 'imminent peril', which did not favour the more environmentally sensitive approach that could have been produced by the Court had the precautionary principle had more of an effect on it. However, the differences between the two situations are important in terms of the way that the Court's power over Hungary and Slovakia was produced. In assessing what 'imminent peril' meant, the Court did not appear to have any other evidence from, for instance, the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, which would have suggested that the practices of states favoured giving credence to 'uncertain' risks to the natural environment. In interpreting what 'equitable utilisation' of a watercourse referred to in assessing what Hungary had been deprived of, the Court instead had the 1997 Watercourses Convention which, although it had not come into force at the time it was delivering its judgment, was reflective of years of drafting work by the ILC. In other words, the approach of the Court to how it assessed whether Slovakia had deprived Hungary of its right to equitable utilisation of the Danube was socially constructed through the productive effect that sustainable development had on the Court's power.
VI. Productive Power of Protecting the Future Generation and Transboundary Harm
The discussion in this section continues to explore the interplay between principles and productive power, but from a different perspective. It examines whether the open-textured nature of some environmental principles can function as frames which help the ICJ to develop a common understanding of deeper philosophical views on how the environment should be protected. The significance of this discussion lies in highlighting how the ICJ can potentially develop unique positions on environmental issues which can then be used in litigation before it, as well as in the development of international law more generally. In the Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania), the ICJ noted that 'certain general and well-recognized principles' were binding on Albania, one of which was that every state had an 'obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States'. 147 Although the Corfu Channel Case did not involve an environmental dispute, various scholars use the transboundary harm principle identified by the Court to indicate that, as far back as 1949, the ICJ had made statements 'pertinent to transboundary environmental issues'. 148 The transboundary harm principle, in its different formulations, has been described as the 'cornerstone of international environmental law'. 149 It was originally raised as a norm in the Trail Smelter Case (Canada/United States of America) arbitration decision involving Canada and the United States. 150 Although not in the form stated by the ICJ in later cases, it was codified in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and then in similar terms by Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. 151 The version that appears in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration identifies that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 152 It has been argued that if the Trail Smelter Arbitration were to be retried, it would not be decided any differently, given the way international environmental law has evolved since that case. 153 Interestingly, in the Trail Smelter Arbitration, Canada did not have to stop operating the smelter that caused the pollution but rather had to ensure that its activities were harmless to the territory of the United States. Horbach and Bekker, argue that, because of the precautionary principle, the onus of proof that is on states in the light of the transboundary harm principle may in fact change. 154 As a result, some types of domestic activities might now cause 'certain types of significant transboundary harm (biosafety or biodiversity injury)', whether it is today or at some time in the future, and which may need to be stopped. 155 They also point out that this view is consistent with a reading of article 1 of the 2001 Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities adopted by the ILC. 156 This observation by Horbach and Bekker suggests that the transboundary harm principle appears to have a core which has not been modified. However in its application one has to become increasingly aware of the risk associated with certain types of activities that are not currently unlawful under international law. 157 The ICJ has confirmed a version of the transboundary harm principle which not only reproduces a core idea common amongst many definitions of the norm but, because of its open-textured nature, has produced it in a new form by drawing on a variety of novel ideas and concepts. Given that this formulation is similar but also different to what appears, for instance, in the 2001 ILC Transboundary Harm Convention, or earlier in Principle 21 of Stockholm Declaration or Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, it is arguable that the social learning is uniquely that of the ICJ. It is, however, the interaction of the ICJ with the productive power of the idea of needing to protect the future generation that has provided further nuance to the open-textured nature of the transboundary harm principle in this instance. 158 As a 153 Horbach and Bekker, above n 148, 367-70. 154 Ibid 370. 155 158 This work uses the notion of protecting the future generation as an idea that is collectively held amongst groups of actors. It is its instantiation in norms like the transboundary harm principle which confirms the idea that it is part of the collective result, the open-textured nature of the transboundary harm principle has allowed the ICJ to establish how it identifies with the idea of protecting the future generation from environmental harm. The rest of this section will show how the version of the transboundary harm principle which was developed and has now been adopted by the ICJ through a number of cases is unique, and how its construction is a reflection of the interplay between the productive power deployed within the ICJ and the principle. In 1994, the UNGA asked the ICJ for an Advisory Opinion as to whether according to international law the threat or use of nuclear weapons was permitted under any circumstances 159 Amongst other matters, the Court had to consider whether the various formulations of the transboundary harm principle that had been put to it would be violated were nuclear weapons to be used by any state. 160 In delivering its judgment in the Nuclear Weapons Case, the ICJ also developed its own language for giving expression to the transboundary harm principle when it stated that: the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn. The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment. 161 A number of differences can be observed between the two different versions of the transboundary harm principle developed by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case and the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. These differences include:
1 the focus of the principle is now not just on sovereign territorial space but also areas of the world that are beyond national control; 165 2 the idea that states must 'respect' the environment as a unique addition to how it has been previously formulated and which suggests a level of care beyond what one is obligated to; 166 and 3 an explicit statement that the environment includes the interests that the future generation might have in the 'living space' of humans, and that we must 'ensure that they have some quality to their lives and can remain healthy'. In relation to the first point, the original formulation of the transboundary harm principle did not include any references to the global commons. 167 Although Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration refer to areas that are beyond the 'limits of national jurisdiction', the ICJ specifies more precisely that the parts of the world which are beyond territorial boundaries are important for the purposes of the transboundary harm principle. In other words, the extension of the principle for the ICJ is apparent, but it is limited in terms of areas that are potentially a 'living space' for humans or might impact our health in some way. Importantly, this formulation by the ICJ appears to go further than what is specified in the 2001 ILC Transboundary Harm Convention. 168 In article 2(c), for instance, it limits the scope of its provisions to harm caused by states to places that are 'under the jurisdiction or control of a State'. 169 This extension of the principle by the ICJ stands out, given that it has been commented that the ILC was 'cautious to develop' the articles in the Convention 'along the lines established by related international instruments, in particular the principles embodied in the Rio Declaration of 1992, the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 …' 170 The implication of the extension of the transboundary harm principle in this way by the ICJ is important because it can potentially apply to situations that involve multiple actors Environmental Law, above n 43, 143, fn 150, who has suggested that Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration could not have been used because nuclear weapons could cause much harm to the natural environment of the world and not just to those of neighbouring states. 165 and include harm to the global commons, such as the depletion of the ozone layer. 171 Second, the ICJ raises the prospect that the word 'respect' in the context of the transboundary harm principle changes the threshold required for assessing what states are allowed to do to areas outside of their jurisdiction. 172 The commentary on the 2001 ILC Transboundary Harm Convention identifies the terms 'significant', 'serious' and 'substantial' as some of words used in judgments and treaties to describe existing thresholds for assessing whether the damage caused to territory outside of a state's jurisdiction should attract liability. 173 The 2001 ILC Transboundary Harm Convention actually adopted the term 'significant transboundary harm' as the threshold for what states should avoid. 174 In its commentaries to the Convention, the ILC noted that the term 'significant' involves 'more factual considerations than legal determination'. 175 It noted that the term 'significant', while determined by factual and objective criteria, also involves 'a value determination which depends on the circumstances of a particular case and the period in which such determination' is to be made. 176 Clearly, the term 'respect' is a much more open-textured notion than the phrase 'do not cause', which appears in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and is far more value driven than the term 'significant', which is used in article 3 of the 2001 ILC Transboundary Harm Convention. 177 The reason for making this distinction is that the ICJ leaves open the possibility that, in arguing before it, a state might be able to include, for instance, a broader 'category of environmental expenses, including monitoring and assessment expenses and actual clean-up costs'. 178 Weiss has also argued that the use of the word 'respect', rather than 'do not cause', imposes a broader obligation on states than that required by Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. 179 Lastly, from a philosophical or ethical perspective the ICJ appears to be stating that our relationship with the environment should unashamedly continue to be anthropocentric. 180 The basis for acting to prevent transboundary harm is simply because of the particular value that nature has for human beings. This view of the principle has an impact on the direct or indirect responsibility states have to protect the natural world within another jurisdiction or globally if it has apparent value for human beings. Although this sounds critical, this approach of the ICJ to the transboundary harm principle is important for highlighting the way that its power has been produced by its concern over the future generations. That is, the rights of future generations are in themselves an abstraction which needs to be specified. In valuing nature in term of a 'living space' as well as for the 'quality of life and the very health of human beings', the ICJ appears to be specifying the areas where emphasis must be placed in terms of the transboundary harm principle. Importantly, the ICJ also suggests that states are no longer just concerned with the impact that transboundary harm has on the sovereignty of other states, but with people and their relationship to the natural environment.
The above discussion shows that the ICJ commonly identifies with a particular approach to the transboundary harm principle in international law and politics which it has reaffirmed over several judgments, including the Nuclear Weapons Case, the Danube Dam Case and also the River Uruguay Case (Interim). There are significant differences between its approach to the principle and, for instance, the like 'significant', 'serious' or 'substantial'. A state is likely, under this conception of the principle, to have to engage in impact assessment of projects and conduct other due diligence activities in consultation with neighbouring states. This is especially needed if there is the potential that their activities within their jurisdiction might not show 'respect' towards those of the neighbouring state. In this sense, the ICJ was able to use the open-textured nature of the environmental principle to redefine it in a way that still maintained its core connection with other formulations of it in, for instance, the 2001 ILC Transboundary Harm Convention. It was also able to provide a nuanced view of it that is more in line with protecting the interests of the people who live in neighbouring states, whose environment might otherwise get harmed from a lack of due diligence by other states.
VII. Conclusion
The ICJ has not frequently used environmental principles in determining the legal positions of parties appearing before it. 181 As this article has shown, this does not necessarily mean that such principles have not contributed to the way the ICJ has positioned itself in changing international law and politics. In terms of the three different ways in which the role and function of environmental principles were examined, it appears that the ICJ has been most directly engaged with the transboundary harm principle, and has generated a common understanding of it that is significant in the context of international law more generally. Its open-textured nature has meant that ideas about protecting the future generation have been able to produce the Court's approach to it and distinguish its meaning from other efforts to regulate behaviour in relation to environmental harm that is not unlawful under international law. Although states have yet to use it directly in litigation before the Court, it also has potential for creating expectations in international law and politics more generally. Also, given the potential discussed earlier in this work for other international courts and tribunals to draw from the jurisprudence of the ICJ, the collective social learning within the Court in this respect is significant for change in law and politics through dispute resolution, The analysis in this respect has also highlighted how open-textured environmental principles which have a long history of development in international law might create opportunities for the Court to shape and advance its own common understanding of environmental issues. Clearly, the fact that the ICJ has been willing to adopt a more environmentally focused view of the transboundary harm principle than the 2001 ILC Transboundary Harm Convention is important. It suggests that there is potential amongst the Bench to construct meaning from its own interactions with disputing parties rather than confining itself to norms in conventions and treaties.. However, the approach of the Court to whether environmental principles, as an abbreviated abstraction, can constitute or produce the way it approaches its interpretation of legal provisions and issues is not so promising. A closer examination of the pleadings of both Hungary and Slovakia in the Danube Dam Case showed that parties have commonly relied on environmental principles in making their arguments to the Court. The interactions amongst the parties in that case, however, failed to convince the Court that its views of 'imminent peril' should develop alongside a precautionary approach to how nature is valued. In contrast, in its approach to the concept of 'equitable utilisation', the Court appears to have been influenced by the ideas captured by sustainability in its abbreviated form. This does not necessarily suggest that sustainable development played a significant role, given that article 5(1) of the 1997 Watercourses Convention could also have shaped how the Court interpreted the concept of 'equitable utilisation'. However, neither Hungary nor Slovakia relied on the 1997 Watercourses Convention and neither argued in terms of sustainability. 182 It is therefore possible, that concerns over sustainability had a diffuse effect on how the Court asserted itself, in relation to Slovakia's diversion of the Danube as a countermeasure against Hungary.
The engagement of Hungary and Slovakia with the Court in the Danube Dam Case has created an expectation that it might once again emphasise environmental harm as an aspect of what constitutes proportionality in the context of countermeasures. However, compared with the interplay between the precautionary principle, sustainable development and productive power through the ICJ, it does not seem certain that environmental principles are likely to play a significant role in collective social learning within the Bench in this respect. That is, the interpretations by the Bench of established norms in the Danube Dam Case were not significantly swayed by either of these two principles. However, given the Court's approach to sustainability, it is arguable that environmental principles might constitute the way the Court interprets legal issues -especially if other treaties or conventions can confirm their approach. If international environmental law continues to develop in the light of concerns over the harm we cause to the natural environment, its principles might increasingly constitute how the Court exercises its interpretive powers over established norms. In this sense, environmental principles could develop greater significance for learning within the Court and collective understanding emerging from it.
Lastly, it was argued that the social interaction of states post-adjudication is made meaningful by the Court's diffuse exercise of power, which may be ideologically framed, amongst other factors, by environmental principles. The process of litigating is itself a social activity whereby the preferences of states are shaped during it. Environmental principles contextualised within this social process have the potential to encourage diplomatic relationships to progressively reveal what the actors' interests might be in the context of the overall dispute beyond the litigation itself. In these contexts, environmental principles as abstract or opentextured norms are important because they function as norms with the potential to communicate with parties beyond the case. In this sense, environmental principles can identify for the parties a greater range of ideas and possibilities to use in their negotiations, in contrast to rules that are closed normatively.
The work of the ICJ in dispute resolution is not an easy case through which to study the role and function of environmental principles. Despite this, the power of the Court appears to be constituted in different ways by the potential that environmental principles have to help it create meaning from its interactions with disputing litigants. Importantly, it appears that the variable nature of the ways in which groups of actors socially learn to intersubjectively associate with each other or develop a common knowledge about something are important for understanding the role and function of environmental principles in bringing about change at the international level. In the context of the study discussed in this article, the abstract and open-textured nature of environmental principles has meant that their function and role are subtler than expected in their effects on the learning process.
